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Abstract
Widespread unjustified views on the role of the observer, the indi-
viduality of quantum processes, the relation between decoherence and
irreversibility, Bell’s quest for ‘beables’, the direction of time, and the
concept of experience are revealed, whereby a better understanding is
achieved of what the evolutionary picture is all about and what is re-
garded as missing in already existing realistic pictures.
1. Why was [2] published in Communications in Mathematical Physics? The
idea was not to formulate a new theory, nor even get to grips with the inherent
difficulties of the proposed research program so that a theory could be formed.
An unquestionable benefit of [2] is the brave confrontation with widespread
positivistic doctrines, especially to put forward the convictions which shall lead
to a new picture of quantum world—an evolutionary picture (EP). It is the
purpose of this comment to reveal the prejudices hidden in the EP and to
compare with already existing realistic pictures, in order to understand: what
is the EP about? The clear answer given in [2] (all further quotations are
from source [2]) “an evolving pattern of events with causal links connecting
them” is not taken seriously—oddly enough—because “idealizations cannot be
avoided”. Haag neglects giving definitions of basic concepts; he even argues
that this would only be possible in “asymptotic situations”, whereby the EP
keeps up the vagueness of orthodox quantum theory (OQ). Also the description
of OQ is imprecise—even in sensitive fields. It is not clear which of the various
Copenhagen interpretations is on the agenda—a decisive matter, because Haag’s
main motivation is “the desire to separate the laws of Quantum Physics from
the presence of an observer”.
2. The EP and Bohr’s epistemological analysis. The central feature of
the EP is an event: the “transition of a possibility to a fact”. From Bohr’s
epistemological analysis of quantum processes Haag adopts “indivisibility”—an
apparently reasonable step. No attempt is made to draw a picture that would
give a “subdivision of such processes...an objective meaning”. Instead an event
generalizes the notion of measurement result because it “is considered as a fact
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independent of an observer”. Haag’s description of “the narrow view” of OQ
is inappropriate, and lots of the unjustified features of the EP arise from these
misunderstandings.
One can say, contrary to the usual concentration on the objective world,
classical physics (CP) is the projection of the objective and timeless proper-
ties of reason (like logic and mathematics) on the outside world. As forms of
intuition (Anschauungsformen) and conceptions of understanding (Verstandes-
begriffe), basic notions like space, time, and causality are properties of cognitive
faculties. The subject that constitutes CP is not part of nature and does not
depend on the flow of time. It is faced with nature: thinking and decisions of
free will are independent of nature. If CP is taken for granted, experience is
the cognition of objects by perception, i.e. the classical interpretation of an ob-
servation. Bohr of course analyzed atomic processes according to this concept
of experience. As a result he challenged epistemology: How can experiments
with atomic systems constitute experience? Strictly speaking, it is impossi-
ble to interpret these experiments with classical notions, i.e. causally in space
and time; they give only complementary fragments of experience, which can be
translated into the symbolism of OQ, but classical experience cannot be com-
posed of these fragments. In this context the notion of individuality should
indicate that within a measurement intermediary stages cannot be interpreted
classically. Further, OQ teaches that for processes with nonnegligible action
it is not possible to design a real outside world: “There is no quantum world”
(Bohr). This ‘teacher’, however, is not a positivistic prejudice about unobserved
quantities as Heisenberg’s early writings announced effusively, but the notion
of experience that presupposes realistic, namely classical, theories.
Von Neumann agreed in no way with such dogmatism about CP; his prin-
cipal concern was to abandon causality. He introduced randomness according
to the expression ‘disturbing of phenomena by observation’, which was later
rejected by Bohr as misleading. Strictly speaking, von Neumann projected
the relation between nature and subject on every single observation. On the
pretext of the principle of psycho–physical parallelism he justified the collapse
postulate as an image of the indescribable (but nevertheless incompatible with
the assumed principle) interaction between subject and object. (Its concrete
formulation was abstracted from the Compton–Simons experiment.)
Bohr’s interpretation has no problem with unobserved quantities if they are
classical. If the action is nonnegligible, independent reality is denied. Different
to von Neumann’s quantum theory: unobserved systems evolve according to
Schro¨dinger’s equation. Observations go beyond physics. As usual now, Bohr
has to take the rap for representing an observer–overloaded quantum theory.
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But something similar to von Neumann’s position is expressed: “...if we want
to understand the word observer in a wider sense we must endow him at least
with the faculties of consciousness, intelligence in planning and free will in
execution.” Bohr stressed that it is impossible to separate phenomena and
agencies of observation. Consciousness is in this connection irrelevant. Only von
Neumann’s projection introduced it. As a result they had different views on the
outside world. And, loosely speaking, Bohr’s ‘theory’ is about the wave function
ψ (not as a physical quantity) and the classical world, while von Neumann’s
‘theory’ is about ψ and the consciousness. All these things are poorly expressed
in [2]. Where exactly does one draw the dividing line between observer and
subject? What causes the quest for realism: the prominent role of measurements
in OQ, or the agencies of observation which one does not expect in CP?
More important is Haag’s inconsequence concerning “the epistemological
analysis of Niels Bohr”. On the one hand, he had “no basic disagreement” with
this analysis. On the other hand, he throws doubt upon it, because he “claim[s]
that there are discrete, real events on any scale”. Surprisingly, the obvious cause
of this doubt—the abandonment of the ‘shifty’ split which is necessary for the
consistency of Bohr’s ‘theory’—is not mentioned. On the contrary, everything
is done to repress the doubt—by the shady excuse that “an individual event
is an asymptotic notion”. To elaborate—with the help of the notion of event
phenomena and agencies of observation can be separated: an event (generally
speaking) rearranges the division between system and apparatus by introducing
a definite split between an irreducible system—where the event occurs—and its
surrounding—which serves for amplification. In von Neumann’s language: the
collapse occurs at a definite boundary. In Bohr’s language: on what subsystem
can we gain fragmentary experience with certainty? Although the contradiction
to Bohr’s analysis seems to be weak—indivisibility is not touched—‘quantum
world’ gets a new status: it is ‘created’ by the EP. Bohr’s ‘theory’ is about the
(merely symbolic) ψ investigated from the classical outside world. The EP is
not simply an extension which is enabled by an “alternative language”, but a
different theory about ψ and events occurring in the nonclassical outside world.
There is no need for a classical world to constitute the quantum world.
3. Comparison with ‘consistent histories’ (CH). CH is a theory about ψ
and events: the values of observables which are assigned if a certain decoher-
ence condition is fulfilled. There are two main differences between the EP and
CH. The first one concerns time. CH draws a timeless picture, a history, i.e. the
values of observables at a sequence of time, has no preferred direction. On the
contrary, in the EP time is directed. It distinguishes by an irreversible process
the (extended) moment when a possibility becomes a fact and with it a flow of
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time (the past is fixed, the future is open) is supposed to be introduced. In this
sense the EP is a theory about ψ and events which pop up out of “possibili-
ties” (their specification and probabilities are determined by ψ). But now the
question arises (corresponding to the second difference): what is analogous to
the decoherence condition? Bohr’s insistence on classical experience is thrown
into doubt. Only an evasive answer is given: “the hinging of basic concepts to
asymptotic situations which are only approximately realizable”. The division of
a measurement in an event and an amplification suggests the following strange
picture: The surrounding defines according to which observable the possibili-
ties are formed out of ψ (though no interaction with the surrounding occurred).
The decision for a certain possibility is made when something like a decoherence
condition is fulfilled. If the event is shifted to macroscopic bodies, it is difficult
to establish a difference between the EP and ‘spontaneous localization’ (SL).
But all these are speculations about a non–existent theory, strictly speaking
about the mentioned shady excuse.
4. Are there “events on any scale”? It is difficult to analyze a non–existent
theory, but if this claim is maintained, the probabilities of events would differ
from those calculated by OQ. The unaffected interpretation of Schro¨dinger’s
equation, namely “it describes the continuous change of probabilities for pos-
sible facts”, in other words an observable has a certain value and its probabil-
ity is calculated by Born’s (generalized) rule, nevertheless contradicts Born’s
rule. The reason is simply the theorem of Kochen and Specker, which forbids
the assignment of probabilities to too many ‘observables’ consistent with OQ.
(Applied to the EP, this is a statement about “possibilities”.) Although the
probabilities are calculated in the same way, they have a different meaning. In
the EP probabilities are no longer conditional probabilities presupposing that a
measurement is actually performed. (For an application to CH, turn to [1].) In
order to maintain consistency with OQ, events cannot exist on any scale. The
way out of OQ, whereby it is impossible to perform arbitrary measurements
simultaneously and that their results are joint products of system and appara-
tus, cannot be ignored by a realistic interpretation and must lead to a further
constraint on the notion of event—no such thing is mentioned in [2].
5. Decoherence and irreversibility. In order to be real, it is argued in [2],
events have to be irreversible—a new type of irreversibility. The explanation
of irreversibility by statistical mechanics is restricted to the macroscopic world:
“If we believe that this is the only mechanism by which irreversibility can arise
we must conclude that the elementary processes, even if isolated, cannot be re-
garded as real but needs the macroscopic amplification before we can talk about
a fact.” Contrary to this view, Bohmian mechanics (BM) gives an example of
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a deterministic and time–symmetric theory which clarifies the relation between
decoherence and irreversibility and which includes even events as an asymptotic
notion in its phenomenology.
To explain the occurrence of facts in OQ by decoherence (without an ad-
ditional collapse postulate) is naive and ambiguous. BM has in this respect a
more striking concept (striking, because BM has no ‘measurement problem’)
of distinguishing between orthogonal wave functions and wave functions with
disjoint supports. The analysis of decohering processes (like scattering of fast
particles or the formation of bubbles in a bubble chamber) shows that those
producing wave functions with (nearly) disjoint supports (like scattering of fast
particles or the formation of bubbles in a bubble chamber) are practically irre-
versible. (You cannot catch up with a photon that is flown away, a macroscopic
number of degrees of freedom is uncontrollable.) Events are defined—with fa-
miliar mathematics—as the inverse images of random variables (deterministic
functions on configuration space). They can be regarded as an asymptotic
notion in the following sense: typically the range of a random variable is a
continuum, but in a certain limit (e.g. if the velocity of a scattered particle
or the number of molecules in a bubble tends to infinity) the range consists
of discrete values, which become strictly correlated to an appropriate (macro-
scopic) variable defined on the configuration space of the surrounding. Which
of these discrete values “is selected by nature in the individual case” is traced
back (deterministically) to the initial configuration.
Why should Bohr be alleged to have wanted to introduce a notion of strict
irreversibility? Irreversibility in the context of observation should emphasize
the gap between classical and quantum mechanics: interference destroyed in
the (necessary) amplification up to the classical domain cannot in practice be
recovered. Also Pauli—well–known for his judgement of fundamental questions
and never in conflict with Copenhagen—never mentioned irreversibility in his
textbook, but “...during each measurement an interaction with the measuring
apparatus ensues which is in many respects intrinsically uncontrollable”. From
this point of view the justification of why events should be irreversible, namely
because events are the warranted extrapolation of irreversible measurements, is
not only vague, but also disproved by BM (if the necessity of irreversibility is
claimed).
6. Event as the “transition of a possibility to a fact”. Events are supposed to
introduce an irreversible element unknown to CP. They reveal much about the
role of the subject because this new type of irreversibility is justified by a certain
feature of indeterministic theories: facts are “related to the past” and “possibil-
ities are related to the future”. Accordingly, “statistical statements in physics
5
must always be future directed”. This results from an (apparent) interlink be-
tween probability and experience—affected in a Laplacian world. Furthermore,
experience is understood as learning from the past for the future. Undoubtedly
it is consistent to construct physics as an empirical science together with a fu-
ture directed notion of probability and an adjusted temporal logic, but in view
of the timeless axioms of Kolmogoroff and the objective forms of cognition it
seems very unlikely that this concept of physics is necessary . The intention is
undoubtedly to overcome the timelessness of CP and to throw the subject into
the flow of time. Because of this, thinking does not become a process in nature,
only the (plausible) psychological flow of time is projected onto nature. This
projection also seems to distinguish the (extended!) present moment when an
event occurs, and with it part of the future becomes the past.
Neither perception of events as irreversible nor this concept of temporal
experience seem to be convincing and necessary. The flow of time and with
it directing the links between events is as fictitious as in CP: time is standing
still. The evolutionary point of view of nature differs from the classical one
only concerning determinism. Evolution as a “growing category” is fictitious—
produced in a projection of our sensation of time on physics.
7. Events as ‘beables’. Footnote 1 in [2] gives an example of the pernicious
influence of mathematics on science: the adoption of formulating results as
statements about limits. As Bell pointed out these limits blur fundamental and
practical questions. A classic example is a density matrix where the off–diagonal
elements weakly vanish, if the apparatus becomes arbitrarily large. Focussing
on the system, ‘and’ has been replaced by ‘or’—by an innocent increase of the
apparatus. Bell’s “quest for ‘beables’ which can be precisely defined under
any circumstances” is the demand for a clear ontology which avoids such blurs.
Analogously, in the EP the practically uncontrollable decoherence in a measure-
ment is converted into strict irreversibility. In a theory with precisely defined
‘beables’, e.g. BM, no such blunder occurs—every unavoidable shortcoming of
our models can be analyzed on the practical level.
And if a theory is based on the notion of irreversible events, these events
are by no means an “asymptotic notion”, but in every special model they are
sharply defined (though extended) in space and time in irreducible subsystems.
There is no need for a limit to define events. The more detailed the model
is designed the more precise should be the theoretical predictions—again all
differences appear on the practical level. To regard the vagueness of OQ—
the shiftiness of the split—as a consequence of the fact that “with increasing
insistence on precision the subdivision of the universe must become necessarily
coarser and the description less detailed” shows on the contrary that events are
6
not taken seriously as the fundamental concept of the EP.
8. Is there any connection with Whitehead’s process–metaphysics? On the
one hand, since Haag claims to agree with Bohr’s epistemological analysis, es-
pecially by adopting the concept of indivisibility, he supposes Bohr’s concept
of experience. On the other hand, the statement that “physics transcends epis-
temology” supports an adaptation of experience to physical theory (against
the widespread view among physicists and even critics of positivism that ex-
perience is independent of any physical theory). The (repressed) doubt about
Bohr’s analysis confirms this view. Was Bohr too cautious when he stressed
the classical behaviour of the apparatus? The notion of event forces one to
abandon Bohr’s concept of experience. Because of that the statement “the raw
material of physics, which the theory is supposed to explain, consists of facts
which can be documented” becomes extremely ambiguous. Are ‘facts’—in ac-
cordance with Bohr—characterized by a classical description, or will the EP
supply the definition of what can be regarded as a ‘fact’? Or is a ‘fact’ even
regarded as independent of any theory like our data of perception? None of the
alternatives fits in [2]: Was the concept of experience—in spite of the allegiance
to Bohr—disregarded or dismissed as meaningless? The EP has to take up the
challenge of epistemology (which led Bohr astray to complementarism), espe-
cially the notion of “indivisibility” has to be justified anew (comparable to the
meaning of space, time, and causality in CP). And the quest for realism can
arise only from the demand to give this justification. Instead, indivisibility is
taken over from OQ for all events. This offers a realistic picture indeed—for
unobserved quantities; but for observations—which was Bohr’s main concern
and touches profoundly the relation between nature and subject—the EP offers
nothing (just as well as CH).
Contrary to this imperfection and ambiguity concerning epistemology, indi-
visibility in the Whiteheadian approach (derived from an analysis of Zenon’s
paradoxes) is complemented by a subjectivistic metaphysics, which yields a
theory of experience: events (if causally tied) are also acts of experience. As
long as the relation between events and experience (connected with the im-
port of indivisibility) is not clarified—usually this is not in the responsibility
of physicists—the EP seems to be a naively realistic picture with an accidental
similarity to a few of Whitehead’s “ideas”. In order to introduce a realistic
picture that “transcend[s] Bohr’s epistemology” the efforts shouldn’t be wasted
on the status of unobserved quantities, even if positivistic criticism forces on
such discussions. Instead more relevant questions suggest themselves: Is Bohr’s
concept of experience inevitable? What is hidden behind von Neumann’s pro-
jection? Was the interpretation that ψ represents the (total) knowledge about
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a system provoked by this denial of the abstract subject? (An interpretation
absolutely strange to Bohr.)
9. “Does Quantum Physics force us to abandon the old picture of a real
outside world?” At least concerning nonrelativistic quantum physics there are
more or less consistent theories without observer: BM, CH, and SL (maybe
a mixture of CH and SL will be added). But the question for the role of the
observer challenges the timeless view human reason takes, which recognizes ‘na-
ture’ as the real outside world. OQ, which is more and more made a scapegoat
because of a misguided concept of nature, should be welcomed to develop a
better understanding of CP. Who except Bohr was ever truly inspired with this
opportunity to get insights in concealed prerequisites and with the quest to
reconcile physical theories with cognitive faculties? Proposals like historical or
evolutionary pictures (with or without a temporal logic) of quantum physics
seem to open up the possibility of giving experience of ‘nature’ a temporary
status and of ‘understanding’ thinking as a process in ‘nature’, but neither CH
nor the EP get away from the timeless perspective offered by CP. The challenge
of physics and epistemology remains: how can thinking proceed in ‘time’? Rea-
sonably, in [2] no attempt is made to derive statements about the mind from the
EP. But it will not take long until this challenge will rehash the discussion about
l’homme machine—now something like an information gathering and utilizing
machine.
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